
Marbury v. Madison: The Supreme Court claims its power
(Taken from Constitution Daily:
Constitution Daily)
Note: C-SPAN’s new Landmark Cases series on historic Supreme
Court decisions – produced in cooperation with the National Constitution
Center – begins Monday, Oct. 5th at 9pm ET. This week’s show features Marbury v. Madison.
In an elegant act of “judicial jujitsu,” the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Marbury v. Madison on February 24, 1803, establishing the high court’s power of judicial review.
The dramatic tale begins with the
presidential election of 1800,
in which President John Adams, a Federalist, lost reelection to Thomas
Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican. Congress also changed hands, with
the Democratic-Republicans achieving majorities in both chambers.
Adams could see the writing on the wall: his party had been relegated
to the judicial branch. In a bid to strengthen Federalist power, he
appointed Secretary of State John Marshall to be Chief Justice of the
United States. Adams also worked with the outgoing Congress to create a
slew of new judicial offices, which he promptly filled with Federalist
jurists.
On March 1, 1801, three days before Jefferson’s inauguration, Adams
stayed up late into the night signing commissions for the new judges.
The “midnight appointments,” as they came to be known, were also
notarized by Marshall, still performing his secretarial duties.
But the rush of presidential transition led to the administration’s
failure to deliver several of those commissions, including that owed to
William Marbury, who had been named a justice of the peace for the
District of Columbia.
On March 4, having assumed the presidency, Jefferson ordered
Secretary of State James Madison not to deliver the commissions.
Outraged, Marbury sued, demanding that the Supreme Court force Madison
to comply.
In
Marbury v. Madison, the Court was asked to answer three
questions. Did Marbury have a right to his commission? If he had such a
right, and the right was violated, did the law provide a remedy? And if
the law provided a remedy, was the proper remedy a direct order from the
Supreme Court?
Writing for the Court,
Marshall answered the first two questions resoundingly in the
affirmative. Marbury’s commission had been signed by the President and
sealed by the Secretary of State, he noted, establishing an appointment
that could not be revoked by a new executive. Failure to deliver the
commission thus violated Marbury’s legal right to the office.
Marshall also ruled that Marbury was indeed entitled to a legal remedy for his injury. Citing the great William Blackstone’s
Commentaries,
the Chief Justice declared “a general and indisputable rule” that,
where a legal right is established, a legal remedy exists for a
violation of that right.
It was in the third part of the opinion that Marshall performed the
“judicial jujitsu” observed by National Constitution Center president
and CEO Jeffrey Rosen in
The Supreme Court: The Personalities and Rivalries That Defined America.
On the one hand, Marshall was strongly disliked by Jefferson,
Madison, and the newly empowered Democratic-Republican Party. If he
ordered delivery of the commissions, he risked simply being ignored by
his rivals, thereby
weakening the young Court. But on the other hand, siding with Madison could be seen as caving to political pressure—an equally damaging outcome.
The ultimate resolution was a deft balancing of these interests:
Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court could not order delivery of the
commissions because the law establishing such a power was
unconstitutional.
That law, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, said the Court had “original jurisdiction” in a case like
Marbury—in
other words, Marbury was able to bring his lawsuit directly to the
Supreme Court instead of first going through lower courts.
Citing
Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution, Marshall pointed out that the Supreme Court was
given original jurisdiction only in cases “affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls” or in cases “in which a State shall be
Party.” Had the Founders intended to empower Congress to assign original
jurisdiction, Marshall reasoned, they would not have enumerated those
types of cases. Congress, then, was exerting power it did not have.
For his concluding masterstroke, Marshall turned to
Article VI,
noting that the Constitution is “the supreme Law of the Land” and that
all “judicial Officers” of the United States are bound by it. Thus, a
law found to be in disagreement with the Constitution—for example, the
Judiciary Act—cannot stand.
To be sure, Marshall
did not invent judicial review—several
state courts had already exercised judicial review, and delegates to
the Constitutional Convention and ratifying debates spoke explicitly
about such power being given to the federal courts.
Still, the legendary Chief Justice applied it firmly and artfully to
the nation’s highest court. “It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial
Department,” he wrote, “to say what the law is.”
In the short run, Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans got what
they wanted: Marbury and the other “midnight appointments” were denied
commissions.
But in the long run, Marshall got what he wanted: a Supreme Court with teeth.
Nicandro Iannacci is a web strategist at the National Constitution Center.